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Abstract  14 
Microbial ecology, the scientific study of interactions between natural microbial communities 15 
and their environments, has been facilitated by the application of molecular and ‘omics-based 16 
techniques that overcome some of the limitations of cultivation-based studies. This has 17 
increased emphasis on community ecology and ‘microbiome’ studies but the majority address 18 
technical, rather than scientific challenges. Most are descriptive, do not address scientific aims 19 
or questions and are not designed to increase understanding or test hypotheses. The term 20 
‘hypothesis’ is increasingly misused and critical testing of ideas or theory is restricted to a 21 
small minority of studies.  This article discusses current microbial ecology research within the 22 
context of four approaches: description, induction, inference to the best explanation and 23 
deduction. The first three of these do not follow established scientific method and are not based 24 
on scientific ecological questions. Observations are made and sometimes compared with 25 
published data, sometimes with attempts to explain findings in the context of existing ideas or 26 
hypotheses, but all lack objectivity and biased by the observations made. In contrast, deductive 27 
studies address ecological questions and attempt to explain currently unexplained phenomena 28 
through construction of hypotheses, from mechanism-based assumptions, that generate 29 
predictions that are then tested experimentally. Identification of key scientific questions, 30 
research driven by meaningful hypotheses and adoption of scientific method are essential for 31 
progress in microbial ecology, rather than the current emphasis on descriptive approaches that 32 
address only technical challenges. It is therefore imperative that we carefully consider and 33 
define the fundamental scientific questions that drive our own research and focus on the ideas, 34 
concepts and hypotheses that can increase understanding, and only then consider which 35 
techniques are required for experimental testing.   36 
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Introduction 37 
Microbial ecology is arguably the most important and least developed area of ecology. 38 
Microbes are ubiquitous, occupy the broadest range of environments, with the broadest range 39 
of environmental conditions, and are essential for all biogeochemical processes and for the 40 
existence of all animals and plants. Despite historical lack of awareness of their importance, 41 
we are now considered by many to be in a golden age of microbial ecology. The number of 42 
microbial ecology research papers has certainly increased significantly in the past three 43 
decades, although at a similar rate to those on plant and animal ecology. Increased research 44 
activity is, in part, due to development of cheaper and faster sequencing methodologies and 45 
their use in characterising microbial communities. This has led to the discovery of 46 
unexpectedly high diversity, previously uncultured microbes, indications of their potential 47 
function and popularisation of the ‘microbiome’ concept. Microbial ecologists have, of course, 48 
been studying microbial communities for decades but increased research has highlighted 49 
potential issues regarding the motivation and aims of microbial ecology research in general.  50 
Microbial ecologists aim to gain understanding of the relationships and interactions between 51 
microorganisms and their environments. Through scientific method, attempts are made to 52 
explain observations and phenomena that cannot currently be explained, to find general 53 
principles or theories that operate across organisms and environments and to test these by 54 
experimentation. Scientific method has advanced over the past four centuries and remains an 55 
area of active study within the philosophy of science. Many aspects are still subject to debate 56 
and it should not be considered as fixed or final; nor is there necessarily a perfect approach for 57 
each ecological study. There are, however, imperfect approaches that are not designed to, and 58 
are incapable of, increasing understanding and which lead to confusion, misunderstanding, 59 
propagation of wrong ideas and wasted resources. Here, I will consider the approaches used to 60 
study microbial ecology and their benefits and limitations.  61 
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I will discuss four approaches: description, induction, inference to best explanation and 62 
deduction. This ‘classification’ is not perfect, but it provides a framework. Detailed discussion 63 
of these approaches is beyond the scope of this article and readers are referred to textbooks, 64 
reviews and online resources on scientific philosophy (e.g. [1 – 6]). (Note that I am concerned 65 
with those aspects of scientific philosophy that provide analysis of, and guidance on how 66 
research should be performed, rather than those that describe how scientists behave.) I will 67 
consider fundamental, rather than applied studies, and will illustrate ideas through examples 68 
from microbial community ecology, particularly my own area of research (soil ammonia 69 
oxidisers). The issues raised, however, apply to all areas of microbial ecology and are not 70 
unique to microbial ecology, or even ecology.   71 
Description 72 
Descriptive or ‘look-see’ studies involve observations and measurements of microbes and their 73 
environments, but with no intention of explaining these observations or increasing 74 
understanding.  75 
Who is there? 76 
The most obvious examples of descriptive studies are surveys that catalogue the microbes 77 
present in an environment. This approach is termed nature study, when performed by amateurs 78 
with basic techniques, or natural history, if more advanced techniques and analysis are used by 79 
professional scientists; it also applies to mining of large quantities of data. Until the 1990s, this 80 
required laboratory cultivation, from an environmental sample, of as many microbes as feasible 81 
and phenotypic classification of each (mainly through determination of numerous 82 
physiological characteristics during laboratory growth). The current approach is high-83 
throughput sequencing of 16S rRNA genes, with identification and phylogenetic analysis 84 
following comparison with database sequences. Sequence analysis of functional genes 85 
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provides similar description of organisms with the potential for a particular function, e.g. 86 
nitrogen fixation, denitrification. These molecular techniques provide limited information on 87 
phenotype but are relatively cheap and rapid; crucially, they do not involve laboratory 88 
cultivation and may provide better phylogenetic information.  89 
The major limitation of descriptive studies is that they are not driven by scientific questions or 90 
theories. They are aimless and cannot, in themselves, answer scientific questions. Sequence 91 
surveys may, and probably will lead to ‘discovery’ of new phylotypes, but they cannot increase 92 
understanding of their ecology or ecosystem function. In the absence of an aim, there is no 93 
basis for determining or justifying study design, sampling protocols, choice of gene(s) or 94 
analysis methods. There is no way of determining, before or after, when or whether enough 95 
sequences have been obtained.  Indeed, there are no criteria for assessing or justifying the need 96 
for the study, the resources (time and money) required or the value of the data obtained.  97 
Descriptions are also, necessarily, limited by and wholly reliant on the techniques that are 98 
available, affordable, feasible and sufficiently rapid and on their accuracy. A criticism of 99 
cultivation-based surveys was selectivity of laboratory growth media and conditions, a major 100 
concern acknowledged by microbial ecologists prior to 1990. Although the remarkable findings 101 
of early molecular surveys demanded assessment of biases and limitations of molecular 102 
techniques, familiarity with these techniques and use of standardised methods and analytical 103 
software have reduced awareness and consideration of their limitations. Examples include cell 104 
lysis bias, extraction efficiency, extracellular nucleic acids, primer bias, variation in gene copy 105 
number with growth rate and other intrinsic and unavoidable biases. Molecular techniques 106 
therefore enable characterisation of uncultivated organisms, but have introduced new biases 107 
and limitations and are far from perfect. In 2050, current molecular techniques will probably 108 
be considered as primitive as we currently view those used in the 1980s. 109 
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What is meant by ‘there’? 110 
The above descriptions relate to organisms and who is (potentially) doing what, but ecology is 111 
the interaction between microbes and their environment, implying that physical, chemical and 112 
biological characteristics of the environment  and biogeochemical process rates should also be 113 
surveyed. Techniques for measuring environmental characteristics have also advanced, and 114 
those that are cheap and easy are frequently measured, but surveys tend to focus on the 115 
organisms (or at least gene sequences), rather than their environment. Again, though, the lack 116 
of scientific aims means that there are no criteria for assessing how many and which 117 
environmental characteristics should be measured.  118 
Who is doing what? 119 
Descriptive studies may also seek information on ‘who is doing what?’. Cultivation-based 120 
approaches automatically generated information on function, but 16S rRNA surveys provide 121 
only limited information. Asexual reproduction and horizontal gene transfer at all phylogenetic 122 
levels prevent consistent or meaningful definitions of species, and other taxonomic units, 123 
allowing only subjective arbitrary operational definitions (hence my use of ‘phylotype’ 124 
throughout this article). They also severely limit prediction of phenotypic characteristics from 125 
phylogeny. The links between function and phylogeny are not completely destroyed; if they 126 
were destroyed, our task as microbial ecologists would be impossible. They are, however, 127 
limited and a major challenge is to understand these limitations, their extent and the 128 
consequences (see, for example, [7, 8] and other articles in this theme issue). In addition, large 129 
proportions of natural communities, as determined by 16S rRNA gene studies, have not been 130 
cultivated and their potential functions are not known.  131 
Current attempts to describe microbial function involve metagenomics and other ‘omics’ 132 
approaches or, for cultivated organisms, analysis of genomes. Omics approaches also have 133 
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major limitations [9] and, at best, provide information only on potential activity. Although 134 
avoiding cultivation, descriptions of potential function again rely on the efficiency and 135 
accuracy of techniques used. Many genes will be transcribed and translated only under specific 136 
conditions, many will be in dormant or dying cells, the predicted function of many (often most) 137 
will be unknown or inaccurate, quantitative functional information is lacking and many 138 
important ecophysiological characteristics have no obvious genetic determinant.  139 
Importantly, however, even if we knew the function of every gene in every microbial cell in an 140 
environmental sample, and knew which genes were transcribed and which proteins were 141 
present, mere description of genes, transcripts and proteins would not increase understanding. 142 
Metagenomic or genomic surveys that lack a question or aim are therefore unbounded and lack 143 
criteria with which to determine end-points, relevance or success. In the absence of such 144 
criteria, we must question the scientific reasons for their existence. 145 
What is the effect of …? 146 
Descriptive studies are, of course, not restricted to community surveys. For example, many 147 
investigate the effect of a particular environmental factor on microbes or their activities. 148 
Although these studies may have an objective and a question, e.g. ‘does temperature influence 149 
soil microbial community composition or activity?’, observing and describing the effect does 150 
not increase understanding or provide explanations that may be more broadly relevant. Again, 151 
the objectives and questions are technical and not scientific. Unfortunately, these studies are 152 
sometimes even presented as testing hypotheses (e.g. ‘we hypothesised that temperature affects 153 
communities’), but these are not meaningful or scientific hypotheses and this represents misuse 154 
of the term ‘hypothesis’ (see below), often in an attempt to make a study seem more ‘scientific’.  155 
Descriptive studies therefore may address technical questions and challenges, but not scientific 156 
challenges. The ease with which molecular, genomic or metagenomic can be obtained invites 157 
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its collection in the hope that something interesting may ‘fall out’ of the data1. This may happen 158 
but the probability of answering an important ecological question without first asking or having 159 
a question is low. Similarly, the chances of finding an explanation for an environmental 160 
phenomenon without first observing the phenomenon is low. As a consequence, these studies 161 
lead to desperate attempts to find a question to which the data provide an answer, to provide 162 
belated justification for the study and to ‘make a story out of the data’, with the unavoidable 163 
bias and subjectivity that this entails. 164 
Are there purely descriptive studies? 165 
In practice, descriptive studies may not always be performed ‘in the dark’. Purely descriptive 166 
studies are sometimes justified as providing baseline data, e.g. prior to monitoring following 167 
environmental change, or when using new techniques or exploring previously unstudied 168 
environments. However, it would be surprising, and worrying, if there was no reason for 169 
expecting environmental change to influence a community or for having an interest in a new 170 
site, and how it might differ from others. These reasons should provide the basis for scientific 171 
questions or hypotheses. Similarly, every environmental characteristic cannot be measured and 172 
every organism cannot be characterised. Decisions must therefore be made on which microbial 173 
groups (bacteria, archaea, fungi, protozoa, functional groups) and characteristics are measured. 174 
Again, it would be surprising and worrying if these decisions were not made on the basis of 175 
underlying views of what is important and interesting. There is, therefore, an implicit, if not 176 
stated reason for expecting something different or unusual that provides the basis for a 177 
                                                 
1 This process is analogous to the idea that a sufficiently large number of monkeys, typing randomly, will 
eventually produce the works of Shakespeare. The probability of this occurring is obviously vanishingly small, 
but of equal significance is the fact that a monkey would not realise when it had produced the works of 
Shakespeare and would continue typing randomly and aimlessly.  
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meaningful study that, if defined and discussed prior to measurements, would provide the basis 178 
for a scientific question and rational experimental design. Indeed, results arising from 179 
descriptions are often described as surprising or unexpected and ‘effect of’ studies are often 180 
described as interesting or even ‘successful’. All of these terms indicate that there was prior 181 
information that could and should have been formulated as a hypothesis. Another perceived 182 
benefit of descriptive studies is in extending databases that others might find useful in 183 
answering ecological questions. However, critical testing of ecological questions generally 184 
requires well considered experimental design, rather than analysis of data that has been 185 
collected randomly.  186 
Induction 187 
In its simplest form (enumerative) inductive reasoning involves creation of a general rule from 188 
a number of observations for a particular class and inference that all members of that class will 189 
follow the same rule. To employ a common example of induction, we examine 50 swans, 190 
observe that all are white and then infer that all swans are white. This approach was criticised 191 
by the 18th century philosopher David Hulme, who questioned whether “instances of which we 192 
have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” [10] i.e. he 193 
questioned whether the past could tell us about the future. He concluded that this process was 194 
not based on reason and was interested in why it was adopted (the problem of induction), 195 
suggesting that it was based on imagination, custom and habit. It is not difficult to find support 196 
for this view. There are many cases in which the past has not predicted the future and previous 197 
success in predicting the future does not logically mean that future predictions will be 198 
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successful2. Induction can be defined more broadly, e.g. relaxing the need for generalisations 199 
and considering the number of ‘supportive’ observations and the lack of contradictory 200 
observations (naïve induction). However, the inductive approach is based solely on 201 
observations and does not provide information on causes or mechanisms. We might be correct 202 
in inferring that all swans are white (although black swans do exist), but we have no 203 
information on why this might be the case, i.e. we may have knowledge but we have no 204 
understanding and no way of confirming our knowledge.  205 
There are many examples of induction in microbial ecology, e.g. inference that all ammonia 206 
oxidisers are bacteria, which was believed until 2005 because all cultivated ammonia oxidisers 207 
were bacteria; or that all plant rhizosphere microbiomes contain a particular phylotype because 208 
it has been observed in 50 plants; or that a physiological characteristic of a single isolate or a 209 
gene in a single genome or reconstructed metagenome will exist in all closely related 210 
phylotypes. Similar extrapolation from properties of isolates to those of microbial relatives in 211 
natural environments has always been a concern of cultivation-based approaches. Model 212 
organisms are important, e.g. for in-depth physiological studies, but they will differ from the 213 
organism that was originally obtained from the environment, because of rapid physiological 214 
and genetic changes occurring during isolation, requiring care in predicting its ecology. (We 215 
would be very wary of predicting the ecology of all cats on the basis of the characteristics of a 216 
wild cat that had been domesticated for 100 generations. Nevertheless, we frequently see 217 
                                                 
2 The dangers of inductive reasoning are illustrated dramatically by the following quote from Captain Edward J 
Smith 1907, 5 years prior to his captaining the Titanic on its final voyage: ‘When anyone asks me how I can best 
describe my experiences of nearly forty years at sea, I merely say uneventful. I have never been in an accident of 
any sort worth speaking about....I never saw a wreck and have never been wrecked, nor was I ever in any 
predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.’ 
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unqualified assumptions about the ecology of relatives of a microbial culture, after a similar 218 
number of generations in laboratory culture.) Single-cell genomics has also demonstrated 219 
considerable genomic diversity within individual rRNA-defined phylotypes (e.g. [11]), 220 
preventing prediction of all of the genetic characteristics of other phylotype members. 221 
Nevertheless, induction is used to infer, often with no qualification or reservation, the functions 222 
and metabolic pathways of relatives in the environment on the basis of a single gene, genome 223 
or chimeric metagenome-assembled genome (even when >50% of gene functions are 224 
unknown).  225 
This is not to suggest that molecular, genomic or metagenomic approaches have no value, but 226 
they have very little value if based on induction alone. In fact, molecular techniques have 227 
themselves provided many examples of the dangers of induction and unquestioning 228 
‘knowledge’. This does not mean, for example, that we should ignore recurring observations 229 
but we should not predict outside the range of our experience in the absence of understanding. 230 
Induction and correlation 231 
Correlation analysis is a powerful statistical technique that can be used to test theoretical 232 
predictions. However, it is most frequently used in descriptive or inductive studies, involving 233 
quantitative analysis of correlations or associations. Indeed, the discovery of high microbial 234 
diversity has fuelled many ‘explorations’ of correlations or associations between community 235 
composition (relative abundances of phylotypes or genes) and environmental characteristics.  236 
I will illustrate this approach with an example from my own research area, where correlations 237 
are determined between soil ammonia oxidiser communities and soil characteristics. 238 
Communities are characterised by analysis of 16S rRNA or a functional gene (amoA genes for 239 
ammonia oxidisers) sequences and 5 – 10 soil characteristics, typically pH, moisture content, 240 
total C, total N, C:N ratio and sometimes soil P, ammonium and nitrate. After grouping 241 
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sequences into arbitrary OTUs, statistical methods are used to quantify correlations between 242 
phylotype relative abundance and soil characteristics, with attention focused on those 243 
associations considered to be statistically significant. Purely descriptive studies stop at this 244 
point and merely report the associations with no interpretation. Others invoke induction and 245 
infer that the associations observed apply to all soils and all ammonia oxidiser communities. 246 
Note that these inferences arise solely from the experimental data after it has been collected 247 
and analysed. Note, also, that these studies make no a priori predictions, e.g. there is no 248 
consideration of which ammonia oxidiser phylotypes might increase or decrease, or why. These 249 
studies only ‘explore’. In providing only descriptions, they suffer the limitations described 250 
above: lack of scientific aims and the absence of criteria for justification, experimental design, 251 
end-points, etc. 252 
A similar approach is adopted in biogeographical studies, in which these environmental 253 
characteristics are supplemented or replaced by environmental characteristics such as latitude, 254 
altitude, mean annual temperature (but not soil temperature), mean annual precipitation (but 255 
not soil moisture content), net primary production, vegetation. The characteristics are chosen 256 
to differentiate the different environments, regardless of their possible influence on microbial 257 
communities, which will be broad, frequently indirect, often overlapping and often negligible. 258 
For example, microbial activity will be affected by soil pH, but this may be through its 259 
influence on the availability of nutrients or on other microbes, plants and animals within the 260 
community and, thereby, microbial interactions. Further issues associated with choice of 261 
environmental characteristics are discussed below.  262 
More commonly, results will be compared to those from other studies, to gain support for the 263 
inference that the associations and patterns observed apply generally. This requires objectivity 264 
but, unfortunately, it is easier to search for data that support an inference than data that do not. 265 
It is also easy to discount lack of support through, e.g. different soils, methodologies, 266 
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experimental design, etc., while similarly criticisms are not made of supportive data. In 267 
addition, while the strength of associations is quantified, comparisons with previous data are 268 
usually made on the basis of qualitative or at best semi-quantitative comparisons, such that 269 
interpretations become matters of degree and opinion and lack precision.  270 
There are also fundamental issues associated with correlation studies, e.g. what is the minimum 271 
number of characteristics required to discriminate the number of phylotypes being considered, 272 
what is the ‘best’ spatial scale, how can this be assessed without aims and criteria? The only 273 
(apparent, but usually unstated) aim of these studies is to explore and look for associations. 274 
The approach is based on the premise that the inferences are correct and aims to accumulate 275 
evidence in support of the inferences. It therefore becomes like a football match, or basketball 276 
game (depending on the number of studies), with scores for and against depending on the 277 
numbers of supportive and conflicting studies. As for descriptive studies these studies are 278 
unbounded in that there is no scientific aim or objective with which to determine the number 279 
of studies required for confirmation of the inferences.   280 
Inductive studies therefore range from naïve induction, which is no more advanced than 281 
superstition or ‘belief’, through attempts to correlate communities with environmental factors 282 
to large scale correlation-based analyses of biogeographical patterns. Although many induction 283 
studies highlight the need to increase understanding, they are not designed or able to do so. 284 
They provide knowledge but not understanding. We might ‘know’, and we might even be 285 
correct in ‘knowing’ that the relative abundance of a particular ammonia oxidiser is always 286 
favoured by a particular combination of the 5 – 10 soil characteristics measured, but this 287 
approach gives no information on why, i.e. there is no mechanistic information. A dramatic 288 
illustration of this distinction is the example of a turkey being reared for Thanksgiving Day 289 
[12]. Turkey contentment increases during rearing, as the turkey is well-fed, warm, dry, 290 
disease-free and much more content than wild turkeys. There will be a strong correlation 291 
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between turkey contentment and contact with the farmer, who provides food and shelter. This 292 
high correlation, however, does not allow the turkey to infer or predict the future correctly, and 293 
contentment falls abruptly when it is slaughtered by the farmer. The turkey had only 294 
knowledge, while the farmer had both knowledge and understanding.  295 
Inference to best explanation 296 
Inference to best explanation describes interpretation of inferences, arising from data, in the 297 
context of existing or new hypotheses or mechanisms in attempts to find the hypothesis that 298 
best explains the data, concluding that this hypothesis is true. For example, selection of a 299 
particular phylotype under certain environmental conditions may be explained through existing 300 
knowledge of physiological or genetic characteristics of its relatives. In fact, many community 301 
studies are implicitly, if unconsciously, testing the concept of niche specialisation and 302 
differentiation. (See [13] for steps involved and some consideration of its application to 303 
microbes.) Briefly, this posits that environmental characteristics will lead to evolution and 304 
selection of strains whose physiological characteristics are best adapted to those environmental 305 
characteristics. The relative abundance of these strains will increase and they will be dispersed, 306 
colonising other similar environments, again through selection based on their physiology. Both 307 
16S rRNA- and functional gene-analyses enable tracking of phylogenetic groups and 308 
correlation is predicted between phylotypes and ecological conditions. The validity of this 309 
concept depends on the validity of the assumptions on which the concept is based. In particular, 310 
it assumes strong links between phylogeny and function, which is considerably less in 311 
prokaryotes than in animals and plants for which the concept was developed (see [13]).  312 
Niche specialisation and microbiomes 313 
In fact, this concept is incorporated, though not intentionally, in the term ‘microbiome’. 314 
‘Biome’ has been used for many years to describe plant or animal communities that have 315 
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common characteristics for the particular environment in which they are found, e.g. temperate 316 
forests. This implies links between physiological and environmental characteristics, for which 317 
there is evidence in plant and animal communities. The ‘micro’ prefix represents microbial 318 
community and, for example, the term soil microbiome refers not just to soil microbial 319 
community composition but also suggests that the community is special in some way, with 320 
physiological characteristics selected by the physical, chemical and biological characteristics 321 
of soil. In addition, the ‘ome’ suffix implies a holistic description, and resonates with terms 322 
such as genomics, transcriptomics and proteomics, although microbiome studies rarely 323 
characterise total microbial communities, usually being restricted to bacteria, omitting archaea 324 
and viruses, and even more rarely including microbial eukaryotes. Microbiome studies 325 
therefore assume implicitly that there is a relationship between the phenotypic characteristics 326 
of the community members and the characteristics of the environment in which they are found. 327 
For eukaryotes, sexual reproduction increases the strength of links between phylogeny and 328 
function and reasonably consistent (but by no means perfect) definitions of species are 329 
provided as units of diversity. For bacteria and archaea, species cannot be defined and links are 330 
much weaker and poorly understood. Despite these major limitations in applying niche theory 331 
to microbial communities, the concept provides the (usually unstated) basis for correlation 332 
studies and for exploring links between communities and their environments.  333 
Application to correlation-based studies 334 
To apply inference to best explanation to the above examples, of ammonia oxidisers and 335 
biogeographical patterns, the implicit assumption is that phylotype relative abundance will be 336 
related to soil characteristics. Correlations lead to inferences and different hypotheses can be 337 
explored that might explain these correlations, but these examples illustrate problems with this 338 
approach.  339 
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Firstly, and fundamentally, niche specialisation suggests a mechanism or cause for differences 340 
in community composition. Soil characteristics will determine the abundance of ammonia 341 
oxidisers as a functional group and differences in relative abundance of different phylotypes. 342 
Crucially, however, correlation analyses do not distinguish cause and effect and we therefore 343 
cannot suggest that an environmental characteristic causes, explains or predicts, or is a driver 344 
of the presence or relative abundance of a phylotype. (This false interpretation of data is 345 
exacerbated by ambiguous terminology. To a statistician, pH may be described as a driver or 346 
predictor or explanatory factor of relative abundance, or as explaining relative abundance with 347 
which is correlated. For an ecologist, this would wrongly imply a cause and effect relationship, 348 
rather than a mere statistical relationship.) It is not valid to consider that correlations 349 
demonstrate direct links between phenotypic and environmental characteristics.  Internet 350 
searches of bizarre or spurious correlations provide many examples of correlations with no 351 
imaginable rationale. They also provide countless examples of football supporters, players and, 352 
even, managers following rituals on the basis of past correlations. The significance of these 353 
correlations usually dwarfs those that we can hope for from community ecology studies, but 354 
are based solely on superstition. Nevertheless, we routinely see examples of inference or 355 
‘prediction’ of future events based on correlations between a few environmental characteristics 356 
and relative abundance of phylotypes with no evidence of causality. This can reflect a 357 
desperate, last resort, arising from ignorance of physiological characteristics, but usually it 358 
reflects a lack of desire to identify scientific questions and consider potential mechanisms prior 359 
to data collection.  360 
Secondly, measured soil characteristics are usually chosen on the basis of custom (‘measuring 361 
what other people measure’), habit (cf. Hume), cheapness, availability of equipment and 362 
expertise, ease of use, fashion, etc. Choice is not based on a priori consideration of 363 
characteristics that might be expected to influence community composition, e.g. through 364 
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knowledge of physiological differences between phylotypes. Ammonia oxidisers are 365 
autotrophs and use CO2, making measurement of organic C irrelevant. It might be possible to 366 
think of a rationale for measuring C:N ratio (it may influence production of ammonia by 367 
mineralisation), but these arguments are never made. Characteristics are often irrelevant in 368 
other ways. Soil moisture content, if determined by rainfall, will vary temporally at scales from 369 
minutes to months and changes in community composition will only occur for those organisms 370 
that react at the same time scales. Moisture content, measured at the bulk scale, does not have 371 
a direct effect on microbes but has many indirect effects: decreased diffusion of oxygen; 372 
increased mobility of soluble nutrients and cells, including predators; changes in root growth; 373 
leaching of nutrients, etc. Some of these factors will interact, e.g. release of soluble nutrient 374 
will increase activity of aerobic microbes, which will decrease oxygen concentration. Increased 375 
mobility of predators will increase predation and nutrient turnover. The lack of relevance of 376 
measured characteristics is illustrated by the fact that the same, very limited number of soil 377 
characteristics are measured regardless of the organisms being studied, their environments or 378 
the scale of study. Niche specialisation assumes a link between physiological and 379 
environmental characteristics, but the characteristics that are routinely measured do not relate 380 
the physiological characteristics that might be expected to lead to lead to differences in 381 
community composition. 382 
A third issue is that microbes themselves will influence many of the characteristics measured. 383 
If metabolic activity reduces pH, as occurs with ammonia oxidation, a negative correlation 384 
between relative abundance of a phylotype and pH may be due to its preference for low pH, or 385 
due to a reduction in pH resulting from growth at a higher pH. Some characteristics, but 386 
surprisingly few, involve measurement of substrates, but does a positive correlation between 387 
abundance of a particular ammonia oxidiser phylotype and ammonia concentration indicate its 388 
tolerance of, and preference for high ammonia concentration? If so, why has it not already 389 
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oxidised the ammonia, reducing ammonia concentration, leading to a negative correlation? 390 
Other soil characteristics change temporally and at different spatial scales and correlations are 391 
often due to two-way interactions, and not simple cause and effect. This applies also, of course, 392 
to microbial (and other communities), which may also be evolving. We should also consider 393 
characteristics that, objectively, are important. Most studies consider community changes only 394 
in terms of microbial growth, while any growth must be balanced by death, unless total biomass 395 
changes significantly. Differences in survival and death rates within community members will 396 
therefore be equally important in determining community composition and diversity, but are 397 
rarely considered. Similarly, versatility, flexibility and speed of response to environmental 398 
change may be more important than growth rate or substrate affinity, but only these parameters 399 
are considered because they are more easily measured, even if irrelevant. Even if communities 400 
have been selected because their physiological characteristics are perfectly aligned with the 401 
environmental characteristics, both will be changing and organisms will presumably be 402 
continually evolving in response to the new conditions. This applies particularly to microbes, 403 
for whom ecological and evolutionary time scales can converge.  404 
This does not mean that we should despair, but it does mean that we need to think carefully 405 
before we begin studies, rather than blindly measuring what others measure, define specific 406 
and better thought-out scientific questions and test hypotheses even more critically. Employing 407 
correlation-based studies to increase understanding is equivalent to thinking with a mental 408 
straightjacket in which any potential explanations or mechanisms are constrained by the 409 
organisms, genes, genomes or metagenomes and environmental characteristics that have been 410 
measured. The straps of the straightjackets are tightened if the environmental characteristics 411 
are chosen merely because they are ‘those that everyone else measures’, as this will constrain 412 
entire fields of study, and not just that of the individual researcher. Any explanation or 413 
hypothesis arising from the data, or from studies generating similar types of data, will be 414 
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restricted by the characteristics measured. The above example would not detect any influence 415 
on ammonia oxidisers through increased predation or the abundance of worms, because these 416 
organisms are not measured.  417 
Correlation studies, and other look-see or ‘effect of’ studies, are sometimes the last resort. They 418 
may provide a starting point when investigating the function or ecology of organisms that have 419 
never been cultivated and about which nothing is known because closest relatives have not 420 
been characterised. This is effectively admitting defeat, in terms of intellectual effort and 421 
imagination, but a survey of effects of environmental characteristics on abundance of this 422 
organism might provide hints. If so, then the focus shifts from the organism to the 423 
environmental characteristics which, in the absence of prior knowledge, should be chosen 424 
randomly and as many as possible should be measured. In these cases, rather than collecting 425 
yet more sequence data, resources should be expended on measuring a greater range of 426 
environmental characteristics.   427 
Deduction and hypothesis testing 428 
Induction approaches are based on data that, in some cases, are then used to assess which 429 
hypothesis provides the best explanation. The deductive approach, in contrast, is closest to the 430 
accepted view of scientific method. This begins with a scientific question or observation of a 431 
phenomenon that cannot be explained and proposals of a hypothesis, or hypotheses, based on 432 
assumptions regarding the cause or mechanism that can answer the question or explain the 433 
phenomenon. If these assumptions are true, then predictions of the hypothesis will also be true. 434 
Experiments are then designed to generate data that can be compared with predicted 435 
observations, to test the hypothesis and the assumptions on which it is based. This process is 436 
also termed hypothetical-deductivism.  437 
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Hypothesis construction 438 
The processes involved in hypothesis construction are difficult to characterise. They involve 439 
analysis, synthesis and integration of current knowledge, but also creativity, imagination and 440 
innovation. Crucially they require thought and intellectual effort and, even more crucially, they 441 
involve thinking before experimental work is even considered. These hypotheses are driven by 442 
attempts to explain phenomena, and are not derived after data have been collected. As a 443 
consequence, for example, in trying to explain why a particular phylotype is associated with a 444 
root, the researcher is not immediately focused on characteristics that are easy to measure (total 445 
soil C, pH, plant species, etc.) but maybe considers how conditions around a root might differ 446 
from the bulk soil, and from any other environment, which physiological characteristics might 447 
be important, whether oxygen will be limiting, whether predators might be more abundant, etc.  448 
Assumptions  449 
Assumptions fall into two categories. The first are those associated with the particular 450 
mechanism being proposed. For example, a phylotype in the rhizosphere of one plant may 451 
increase in relative abundance because the root produces a substrate that is specific for this 452 
phylotype, or through resistance to an antibiotic to which others are sensitive. In the example 453 
above, an ammonia oxidiser phylotype may decrease in relative abundance if it is more 454 
sensitive to high ammonia concentration or increased plant growth results in production of 455 
inhibitors.  456 
The second category comprises a number of simplifying or qualifying assumptions, which are 457 
crucial for two main reasons. Firstly, they ensure that the hypothesis is well thought-through 458 
and is stated with clarity and precision. Secondly, they determine the experimental approach, 459 
techniques and design required to test predictions of the hypothesis.  If the proposed 460 
mechanism is likely to be affected by different environmental factors, then this should be stated 461 
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and should determine experimental design. For example, relative abundance of a rhizosphere 462 
phylotype may increase through provision of a specific nutrient by the plant but this effect will 463 
be difficult to test if temperature or oxygen concentration were varying significantly and 464 
influencing the phylotype for other reasons. The experimental system should therefore be 465 
designed to eliminate these additional, potentially complicating or confounding factors to 466 
enable focus on the specific mechanism being tested. If, however, the mechanism is 467 
hypothesised as the only influence on relative abundance (which is unlikely), then some of 468 
these simplifying assumptions may not be necessary and experimental design can be relaxed. 469 
‘Good’ hypotheses 470 
A ‘good’ hypothesis has a number of desirable properties. It should be bold, risky and 471 
meaningful, addressing an important issue and not stating the obvious. Good hypotheses should 472 
have explanatory power, unifying previously unrelated problems and observations, and great 473 
predictive power. It must be testable and should have generality, with relevance outside the 474 
system on which it is based; e.g. although derived from published data on one system or for 475 
one phylotype, it should be relevant to other systems or phylotypes.  476 
Unfortunately, and frequently, the desire to give the impression of performing hypothesis-477 
driven research leads to use of the term hypothesis to suggest something that is either obvious, 478 
untestable or meaningless. This is common for ‘effect of’ studies. For example, the hypothesis 479 
that ammonia fertilisation will affect soil ammonia oxidiser communities is not meaningful and 480 
is not bold or risky, as we would be very surprised if addition of a substrate did not influence 481 
communities of organisms utilising that substrate. The hypothesis is also imprecise; will 482 
changes occur immediately, or only after a period of incubation; will ammonia influence plant 483 
growth and that of other microbes, leading to indirect effects on ammonia oxidisers; will 484 
ammonia effects themselves be influenced by other factors, e.g. pH, and will these factors be 485 
controlled? The hypothesis is also difficult to falsify. If the communities do not change, the 486 
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researcher could claim that the hypothesis is correct but that deeper sequencing is required or 487 
a longer incubation period. There is also no information on assumptions on which the 488 
hypothesis is based, e.g. mechanisms by which ammonia concentration or supply might 489 
differentially affect ammonia oxidiser phylotypes through inhibition or other mechanisms. 490 
There is no consideration of mechanisms, no mechanistic assumptions and, consequently, 491 
nothing to suggest that the findings could be generalised or are specific to this soil and this 492 
community. In other words, the lack of mechanistic assumptions prevents qualitative and 493 
quantitative predictions, with no information on the magnitude or speed of change, preventing 494 
critically testing of the hypothesis. Such hypotheses are therefore not meaningful, are not 495 
scientific hypotheses and experimental testing will not provide any advance in understanding. 496 
Experimental testing 497 
Experimental testing can take two forms. The first involves accumulation of supporting 498 
evidence to verify a hypothesis, but this suggests that hypotheses or theories can be proved if 499 
sufficient evidence can be collected. It is also easily subject to bias, as it is usually relatively 500 
easy to design experiments that will provide supportive evidence and to think of reasons why 501 
data do not fit predictions, as discussed in the previous section. This problem is greatest for 502 
hypotheses that are vague, poorly defined and non-quantitative.  503 
Popper [5, 6] argued against this approach and proposed that for science to be truly unbiased, 504 
objective and dispassionate, the researcher should design experiments to falsify or reject a 505 
hypothesis. In fact, he used falsifiability as a means of demarcating science from 506 
pseudoscience, i.e. for a hypothesis or statement to be considered scientific, it must be possible 507 
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to think of an observation or argument that would refute it3. He argued, and it is generally 508 
accepted, that it is never possible to prove a scientific theory but it is possible to disprove a 509 
theory. Experiments should therefore be designed with the aim of falsifying a hypothesis and 510 
failure to falsify increases confidence in that hypothesis. The fundamental problem of this 511 
approach, when adopted strictly, is that it lacks an end-point, as there could always be a further 512 
experiment that has not yet been considered that might falsify a hypothesis. Indeed, Popper 513 
suggested that you should have no more confidence in a hypothesis that you have failed to 514 
reject 100 times than one that you have rejected only once. A partial solution is to introduce 515 
the concept of corroboration, in which increasing failures to reject a hypothesis are taken as 516 
corroboration, similar to increased confidence. In addition, rejection does not necessarily mean 517 
that a hypothesis is worthless. It may be that parts are useful and others not and the data may 518 
highlight ways, or the researcher may consider ways in which the discrepancy between 519 
predictions and experimental data can be corrected by modification of assumptions. This 520 
modified hypothesis would then need to be tested with new experiments. Nevertheless, this 521 
approach can be seen as truly objective and dispassionate and it highlights the inability to prove 522 
a hypothesis or theory. 523 
The key feature of the deduction approach is that it begins with a scientific question, i.e. with 524 
a phenomenon that cannot be explained by existing hypotheses and requires construction of a 525 
new hypothesis that is then tested experimentally. It therefore avoids a major criticism of most 526 
ecological studies, which is a lack of scientific aims or questions and reliance on data and 527 
                                                 
3 ‘It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for confirmations. 
Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions... A theory which is not refutable by 
any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice. 
Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it.’ [6] 
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techniques. The approach overtly aims at increasing understanding and, in defining a question, 528 
provides clear and assessable criteria for beginning a study and directs and structures 529 
experimental work. It determines which experiments and which techniques are required, rather 530 
than just choosing those that are available or fashionable, presenting clear criteria for judging 531 
the success of a study. Importantly, it determines which techniques are not required, avoids 532 
unnecessary wastage of resources, avoids attempts at the impossible, or discovery of 533 
impossibility when it is too late, and avoids the need to make stories out of data. This approach 534 
is also more intellectually challenging, which in itself should be attractive and interesting, and 535 
leads to explanations that are not based solely on available data and available techniques; it 536 
removes the mental straight-jacket and, indeed, requires that we think freely and broadly about 537 
how microbial communities interact with their environment.  538 
Analysis 539 
The above discussion considers four approaches adopted by microbial ecologists, but each 540 
contains a range of approaches and boundaries that are sometimes not clear. Nevertheless, this 541 
classification can be used to analyse published work to provide an indication of current 542 
practise. To achieve this, papers published in a single issue of five leading microbial ecology 543 
journals (Applied and Environmental Microbiology, Environmental Microbiology, FEMS 544 
Microbiology Ecology, ISME Journal and Microbial Ecology) were examined. Analysis was 545 
restricted to articles on microbial ecology, rather than biotechnology or other applied aspects. 546 
A total of 100 papers were analysed, with similar numbers from each journal, although I am 547 
not claiming that this can be considered a rigorous study.  548 
Of these papers, 67 were descriptive, of which 36 were purely descriptive, with no indication 549 
that the study aimed to do more than observe and measure, usually community composition. 550 
The remaining 31 were effectively descriptions, in that they did not pose a scientific question 551 
and made little attempt to explain findings. Many of these were ‘effect of’ studies, exploring 552 
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the effect of a particular factor on microbes. While some compared findings with those already 553 
published, they did not use these comparisons to seek explanations or mechanisms. The 554 
introductions to many of these papers highlighted the need to increase understanding, but none 555 
adopted an approach that could achieve this. 556 
Of the remaining 33 papers, 23 could be classified as inference to the best explanation, 10 of 557 
which led to new hypotheses or variations of existing hypotheses to explain observations. Only 558 
10 papers aimed to test a hypothesis. Across all papers, only 22 overtly based their study on a 559 
question, of which only 9 could be considered significant scientific questions.  560 
This analysis illustrates the degree to which the criticisms and limitations of non-scientific 561 
approaches, discussed above, are limiting scientific advances in microbial ecology. These 562 
journals are likely to attract the majority of high-quality microbial ecology articles and their 563 
scope requires papers that provide a scientific advance. It is likely that analysis of microbial 564 
ecology papers in all journals would demonstrate a much larger proportion of descriptive 565 
studies and even fewer based on hypotheses. It is therefore reasonable to ask why such a small 566 
minority of studies are driven by questions and hypotheses, when these are the basis of 567 
scientific method and are designed to increase understanding, while the majority of studies are 568 
descriptive and ‘question-free’.  569 
One explanation for the many molecular and omic surveys and descriptive studies of microbial 570 
communities is that the availability of a new technique often leads to descriptions, but that 571 
these are then followed by scientific studies, as the techniques are used to address questions 572 
and test theory. In most cases, however, theory already exists that allows the descriptive studies 573 
to be by-passed. More worryingly, new techniques are continually appearing, leading to the 574 
view that attempts to increase understanding should be delayed until the next new technique 575 
becomes available. This suicidal approach focuses solely on what can be measured and not on 576 
what needs to be measured, when the value of a technique is determined solely by its ability to 577 
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assist in testing hypotheses and answering scientific questions. It is also suggested that new 578 
techniques identify new phenomena and questions, but there is no shortage of questions to be 579 
answered; there is already much that we cannot explain. More importantly, questions and 580 
phenomena do not rely on descriptive studies. Hypothesis-driven studies using molecular 581 
techniques are just as likely to lead to new discoveries as random molecular or metagenomic 582 
surveys. The nature of hypothesis-driven studies is also more likely to identify truly interesting 583 
and unusual observations and to employ experimental design needed to assess their 584 
significance. 585 
A further justification for induction, particularly of correlation-based, pattern-searching 586 
studies, is that they can generate hypotheses. This may happen, particularly when studies 587 
involve controlled manipulations or treatments, rather than unstructured studies. Similarly, 588 
induction studies involving inference to best explanation can compare hypotheses. In all of 589 
these cases, however, hypotheses are considered after data have been obtained and are solely 590 
dependent on what has been measured. These data cannot therefore be used to test the 591 
hypotheses; this requires further experimental work. Many of these studies, however, could 592 
have been approached as hypothesis-driven studies with valid hypothesis testing, often with no 593 
additional experimental work and usually with less. All involve analysis of published work, 594 
certainly when discussing and trying to explain data, and often when providing background 595 
information in introductory sections. This analysis, if performed prior to experimental work, 596 
would have provided hypotheses that could then have been tested in rationally designed 597 
experiments to enable critical testing of predictions of the hypothesis. This would avoid 598 
collection of irrelevant data and would follow scientific method, with potentially critical testing 599 
of the same hypotheses, but with much fewer resources.  600 
Unfortunately, the dominance, popularity and undemanding nature of descriptive studies can 601 
lead to alternative approaches, such as hypothesis-testing, being seen as idealistic, particularly 602 
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given the complexity and difficulties in studying microbial interactions with natural 603 
environments. However, this complexity in itself demands that a more scientific approach is 604 
adopted. The more difficult it is to explain a phenomenon, the greater the need to clearly define 605 
hypotheses and test them critically, rather than hoping that something interesting will arise 606 
from essentially random observations or, more worryingly, attempting to turn data into answers 607 
and then searching for relevant questions.  608 
The approach adopted in scientific studies is, of course, influenced by many factors that are 609 
outside the scope of this article. My discussion of the philosophy of science has focused on 610 
those philosophers whose thinking aims to improve the scientific process and to assess the 611 
validity of different approaches and interpretation of experimental data. Others are more 612 
concerned with how scientific research proceeds, rather than how it maybe should proceed. In 613 
these respects, we can be influenced by many factors. It is often suggested that microbial 614 
ecology is driven by techniques. Certainly, microbial ecologists, rather than microbial ecology, 615 
are (like many other scientists) driven and seduced by new techniques. Techniques wrongly 616 
become the focus of studies and the availability of new techniques can change the direction of 617 
research, even when they have no scientific value. This is partly through pressure, when 618 
applying for funding and publishing, for research to be seen as ‘cutting-edge’ and there are 619 
many examples of research proposals or papers being rejected through lack of use of modern 620 
techniques, despite established techniques being adequate.  621 
It is also often suggested that microbial ecology is limited by techniques. Techniques are 622 
obviously important for making observations that lead to questions and identification of 623 
unexplained phenomena, and for testing theoretical predictions. We have a vast array of 624 
techniques. It is relatively easy to think of >100 techniques available for the analysis of 625 
microbial growth, activity and interactions in natural environments, even before the 626 
introduction of currently available molecular techniques. We therefore need very good 627 
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justification for investment of valuable time and money in learning yet another new technique. 628 
That justification is rarely presented in terms of the ability of the techniques to test ecological 629 
theory or increase understanding. We have generated a plethora of observations and 630 
phenomena but with a dearth of explanations. It could therefore be argued that techniques do, 631 
in fact, limit scientific progress in microbial ecology by diverting time and money to 632 
development of new techniques that would be better spent on generating and testing new ideas 633 
and theories. 634 
The real limitation to our understanding of microbial ecology lies, not in a lack of techniques, 635 
but in a lack of motivation, enthusiasm, desire and courage to identify and ask significant 636 
scientific questions in advance of experimental work and a lack of testable hypotheses and 637 
theory, i.e. lack of adoption of basic scientific method. In this respect, it is worth considering, 638 
as a microbial ecologist, if you were to be given the answer to a single scientific question, or 639 
given a theory that explained a single phenomenon, what would be your question or 640 
phenomenon; in other words, what drives your science? This questioning is essential if 641 
ecological research is to go beyond mere descriptions and natural history. Identification of 642 
important scientific questions provides criteria by which to assess potential scientific value, a 643 
framework for research, assessment of tractability and feasibility, identification of 644 
experimental systems and techniques required to test hypotheses and, ultimately, criteria for 645 
assessment of success in advancing microbial ecology.   646 
Acknowledgements 647 
I am indebted to Dr Cécile Gubry-Rangin and Professor Graeme Nicol for invaluable 648 
comments on the manuscript and support is acknowledged from Natural Environmental 649 
Research Council grant NE/L006286/1. 650 
 29 
References 651 
1. Curd M, Psillos S. (Eds.) 2013 The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science 652 
(Second Edition), London: Routledge. (doi: 10.4324/9780203744857). 653 
2. Godfrey-Smith P. 2003 Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. 654 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  655 
3. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/ 656 
4. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/ 657 
5. Popper K. 1959 The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic Books. 658 
6. Popper K. 1963 Conjectures and refutations. 1st ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 659 
7. Morris A, Meyer K, Bohannan B. 2020 Linking microbial communities to ecosystem 660 
functions: what we can learn from genotype-phenotype mapping in organisms.  Phil. Trans. 661 
R. Soc. B (in review). 662 
8. Kazuo I, Bouskill NJ, Brodie EL, Martiny JBH (2020) Phylogenetic conservation of soil 663 
bacterial responses to simulated global changes. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (in review). 664 
9.  Prosser JI. 2015 Dispersing misconceptions and identifying opportunities for the use of 665 
‘omics for soil microbial ecology. Nature Rev. Microbiol. 13, 439-446. 666 
(doi:10.1038/nrmicro3468) 667 
10. Hume D. (1739–40) 1975 A treatise of human nature (eds LA Selby-Bigge, PH Nidditch), 668 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 669 
11. Kashtan N, Roggensack SE, Rodrigue S, Thompson JW, Biller SJ, Coe A, et al. 2014. 670 
Single-cell genomics reveals hundreds of coexisting subpopulations in wild 671 
Prochlorococcus. Science 344, 416-20. (doi: 10.1126/science.1248575) 672 
12. Taleb NN. 1960 The black swan: the impact of the highly improbable. New York: Random 673 
House. 674 
 30 
13. Prosser JI. 2012 Ecosystem processes and interactions in a morass of diversity. FEMS 675 
Microbiol Ecol 81, 507-519. doi: 10.1111/j.1574-6941.2012.01435.x) 676 
 677 
